

SF92-0147-0207/V1

ITALIAN ESPIONAGE IN NORTH AFRICA.

SF92-0147-0207



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
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SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

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S. 960 Edn2

SF92-0147-0207/V1



92 - 0147 - 0207

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ITALIAN ESPIONAGE IN NORTH AFRICA.

See Also

[illegible]

MINUTE SHEET

Reference.....

1.

12.1.50. Copy of F.O. cable no. 11 re. details of late GALLIMBERTI. 1a.

2.

12.1.50. ~~Photostat copy of List of Financial Documents found in Dr. GALLIMBERTI's~~
Handwritten: Tried to form part of serial 12a. 2a.

3.

13.1.50. Copy of F.O. cable no. 20 re. GALLIMBERTI's papers. 3a.

4.

13.1.50. Copy of F.O. cable no. 13 from Tripoli re. quantity of incriminating documents found in GALLIMBERTI's flat. 4a.

5.

13.1.50. F.O. cable from Tripoli no. 9 re. GALLIMBERTI's death. 5a.

6.

14.1.50. Extract from SICE report on CHIASUBLE case mentioning Italian esp. activities in Tripolitania. 6a.

7.

16.1.50. Cable from SIME re. permission to search GALLIMBERTI's office. 7a.

	8.	8a.
16.1.50. Cable from SIME re. 6a.		
	9.	9a.
17.1.50. Cable to SIME re. 7a.		
	10.	
18.1.50. Min. from O.S. 1. to O.S. re. visit of Mr. Clutton of African Dept. of the F.O., in conn. with search of GALLIMBERTI's office.		10a.
	11.	
21.1.50. Cable from Tripoli no. 1 re. 1a and 5a.		11a.
	12.	
26.1.50. Extract from F.O. file re. 1a and 4a (documents found in GALLIMBERTI's flask). Photostat copy of documents.		12a.
	13.	
2.2.50. Extract from F.O. file re. 12a.		13a.
	14.	
15.2.50. Cable from F.O. no. 305 re. 12a.		14a.
	15.	
15.2.50. Cable from F.O. to Rome no. 306 re. 14a.		15a.

RECEIVED
 15.2.50
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 15.2.50

Reference

16.3.50.

To SIS enc. copy of paper on HISB el ISTIQLAL.

16л.

16.3.50.

To SDC re. HSB of ISTIGAL.

17a.

4.4.50.

From SIME re. 17a.

18a.

O.S. ✓ Mr. Haldane Porter.

Please see 18a re. "GALLIBERTI's suicide".

Although some three months have now elapsed since this incident happened, I think we might get these telegrams and despatches from the Foreign Office even if only to complete the story in this file.

Do you agree?

$$\begin{array}{r} 0.5.1. \\ \hline 25.4.50. \end{array}$$

(1304) WcY41250/893
750,000 1/49 JCS
Ltd Gp736/209
(REGIMENT)
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IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. August 2006.

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40a
18a

S. I. M. E.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.

SIME/OF.2410/B.1.

31st March 1950.

LONDON.

1. Please refer to your SF.75-Libya-1/051/NCCG dated 16th March 1950.

2. The following Foreign Office telegrams deal with the subject of GALLIMBERTI's suicide and the documents found in his possession at the time of his death:-

- X Tel No.11 of January 12th from Tripoli to Foreign Office
- X " No.13 " " 13th " " " " "
- ✓ " No.1 saving " 18th " " " " "
- X Dispatch No.12.C/20/Pl dated 26th January from Tripoli to Foreign Office
- X Dispatch No.15.C/20/Pl dated 2nd February from Tripoli to Foreign Office
- X Tel No.305 of 14th February from Foreign Office to Rome

Now
Fiche
under date
of dispatch.

3. We have a large number of photostat copies of the actual documents found but they merely confirm in detail the points brought out in the above telegrams.

4. D.S.O. Tripolitania has informed us that there is no truth in the allegation that his office was penetrated by one of GALLIMBERTI's agents (para 7(a) of dispatch No.15 C/20/Pl of 2nd February 1950 refers). An attempt to plant an agent was made but was according to D.S.O. seen through.

NWH/JM

N.W. Howard
N.W. Howard, Major,
for Head of S.I.M.E.

ENCL

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TO

REF

4 APR 1950
SF 75/1460/1

Handwritten signatures and stamps
R5
JUN 1950

Copy made for SF.92-Italy-North Africa. ✓

SF.75-Libya-1/OS1/NCCG.

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17a

To: S.I.M.E.

From: Director General.

Thank you for your SIME/OF.2410/B1 of 23 February, 1950, enclosing copies of your paper on *16a* HISE el ISTIQLAL (Independence Party) of Tripolitania, which we have read with much interest. It has been given the usual distribution and I will let you have any comments which may be forthcoming.

In connection with paragraph 16 regarding GALLIMBERTI's suicide, we would be grateful for more detailed information if it is available, particularly about the documents found in his possession at the time of his death.

15
Director General.

16 March, 1950.
NCCG/ACM.

[Signature]
ACM
17.3.50

Copy for 12.12-Italy-Jordan Office
This letter has also been sent to the following departments

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Foreign Office
Colonial Office
M.I.6 ✓
Admiralty.
War Office.
Air Ministry.

16a

Original in:
EF.75-4470-1/001/1000
at Serial 334.

16 March, 1950.

I enclose a copy of a paper on the
MIB el ISTIGAL (Independence Party) of
Tripolitania, which has been written by
our Middle East Office. Any comments
would be much appreciated.

W.
D. L. Baldane-Porter.

M.I.6.

MOOG/ACM.

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17-3-50

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ACT 1958. August 2006

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16a

OF. 2410

FEBRUARY, 1950.

HIZB el ISTIQLAL

(INDEPENDENCE PARTY)

in

TRIPOLITANIA.

Nº 006810

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CONTENTS.

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 - B ... CENTRAL COMMITTEE
 - C ... ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
 - D ... PRO-ITALIAN ORGANISATION CHART.
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OF.2410

Month of Issue: February,
1950.

The HIZB el ISTIQLAL. (Independence Party in Tripolitania).

Introduction.

1.

The Hizb el Istiqlal is a political party which aims at obtaining the unity and independence of Libya under an Arab national democratic government. Being the party which represents pro-Italian sentiment in the territory, it differs from other local parties in refusing to accept the Emir SENUSI as head of the new state. Although its activities are not in themselves subversive, the party is of security interest in that, firstly it represents the outcome of a prolonged clandestine campaign on the part of the Italian government to make its influence felt in Tripolitania; and, secondly, its very existence is violently opposed by a large section of the anti-Italian population and its activities are therefore liable to provoke disorders.

Events leading up to the formation of the party.

2.

The formation of this party under the leadership of Salem Boy MUNTASSER is the outcome of persistent effort by the Ministry of Italian Africa (M.I.A.). Soon after the war the Ministry re-established contact with Italo-phil Arabs by means of letter writing on the part of former colonial officials to their Arab friends. The letters followed a standard and obviously inspired form, great stress always being laid on the happy days which lay ahead when the ex-officials would return to their former posts.

3.

With the arrival in the territory in November 1946 of a representative of the M.I.A., Dr. Gaetano CHAPRON, the task of welding pro-Italian feeling into a tangible form was begun. Although CHAPRON's terms of reference were to supervise and assist the Administration in the emigration and immigration of Italians, it was soon apparent that he was directing, and was the inspiration behind, all the various activities aimed at making an Italian return acceptable to the Arabs. The first effort was the formation of a Libyan ex-Servicemen's Association under the leadership of an ex-Sergeant, Mohamed ben Ashur BELLUSA. Agents were sent round the country paying out small sums of money to Arabs who had served in the Italian forces; in return for the promise of full pensions and back pay, the ex-servicemen were expected to sign a document to which a heading was later added, asking for an Italian return. These documents were later deposited with the Four Power Commission of Enquiry in April 1948.

These tactics/

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4. These tactics did not, as was hoped, induce a great many people to ask the Four Power Commission for a return of Italian rule. This was a great disappointment to Dr. CHAPRON and shortly after the departure of the Four Power Commission he went to Rome for the purpose of obtaining more money with which to purchase support. That he must have brought some funds with him is confirmed to a certain extent by the increase in pro-Italian activities subsequent to his return. Arab ex-servicemen were bribed to swear affidavits that under threats from the Libyan Liberation Committee and B.M.A. they resigned from the Ex-Servicemen's Association. Italians employed in the Administration carried on a pro-Italian propaganda campaign amongst their Libyan fellow employees, giving them promises of special treatment, trips to Italy, etc. etc. if they would ask for the return of the Italians. Leading Arab notables, in particular Salem Bey MUNTASSER and Ibrahim ben SHAABAN, were given large sums of money for their support and active co-operation with CHAPRON. Summing up these activities it was clear that Dr. CHAPRON, through his organisation (see Appendix "D") was waging a ruthless campaign of bribery and corruption in an attempt to gain an overwhelming demand for the Italian return. The organisation he built up exists today with a very few alterations though Signor GALLIMBERTI succeeded Dr. CHAPRON as its head.

5. CHAPRON's activities were causing such a threat to security that following representations by B.M.A., he was recalled to Italy in June 1948; GALLIMBERTI proved a more discreet person though he obviously had the same brief as CHAPRON. He delegated more of the work to underlings such as Alfonso MARCHESI, Dino CAFELLO, Demetrio CATANESEI, and Angelo Della VALLE, and was at pains not to be seen in their company, but confined his contacts to such people as Conte Athos di BECCATINI and other prominent Italians, and Salem Bey MUNTASSER.

6. In August 1948, an attempt was made to form a new party known as the Hizb as Shaab (The People's Party). Prior information had led to this development being closely watched and it was known that the person inspiring the party and in fact organising it, although his name never appeared, was Alfonso MARCHESI. This blatant pro-Italian party raised a storm of protest and two bombs were thrown, one outside the house of a notorious Italo-phil and the other at the offices of the "Al Italia" airline. The situation became so tense that the party was denied official recognition and MARCHESI, whose machinations had become well known to the Arabs, was advised to leave the territory for some months in the interests of his own safety, which he did.

7. From that time the tactics of the GALLIMBERTI organisation changed and the main effort was concentrated on the more prominent people and tribal leaders. An organisation

calling itself/

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calling itself The Ministry of Italian Africa Office for War Damage Claims was set up under Demetrio CATANESE, an ex-Sergeant of the Italian secret police in Tripoli; the office was used as a channel for distributing money, in the guise of payment against claims, to various Arabs whose names appeared on a list prepared by the Italian Red Cross. This was a list of some 117 individuals, predominantly notables with a sprinkling of merchants and agriculturalists, who were known to be pro-Italian.

8.

The outcome of these new efforts was an attempt in June 1949 to form a Congress in opposition to the National Congress and to the SENUSSI Emirate. The Congress was composed of well-known Italo-phils, some of whom had been committee members of the People's Party. It rapidly dissolved when visited by youth members of the National Congress. One of its members, Towfiq CARLINI, left hurriedly for Egypt, another, Muktar MUNTASSER, had to be given police protection, and a third, Rassem COOBAR, joined the National Congress apparently through an instinct of self-preservation.

Formation of the Party.

9.

The failure of this Congress compelled GALLIMBERTI to take direct action, and a series of meetings at his house were reported. These meetings were attended by the people who have now become recognised as the active pro-Italian nucleus in the territory. A decisive meeting appears to have taken place on 26th June 1949, at the house of Matteo INGRAVALLE, when the party to be was given its name. Salem Bey MUNTASSER accepted the position of president, and the articles of association (see Appendix "C") were drawn up. Salem is reported to have accepted the sum of £4,000 to induce him to come out into the open.

10.

A few days later, on the 3rd July, a letter was received by the Administration from MUNTASSER, notifying his intention to form the HIZB al ISTIQLAL and attaching the articles of association. On 21st July 1949, the formation of the party was formally announced in the Tripoli press.

Strength.

11.

The strength of the party has not yet been established, but the conviction that it commands widespread support is borne out by the names of its committee members (see Appendix "B"). The committee contains notables from every important centre in the territory, as well as from Tripoli city, who will certainly command their own individual following.

Activities/

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Activities.

12.

Early in September 1949, the Hizb el ISTIQLAL organised its first large conference. This conference, which was held in Tripoli and which was attended by about 800 persons, was organised as a counter blast to the National Congress conference held in August and was marked by heckling from National Congress youths, two of whom were arrested by the police.

13.

During the rest of the month most of the party's energies and a considerable portion of its finances were directed towards the despatch of a delegation to U.N.O. At Lake Success the Istiqlal delegation, much to the surprise of everyone, joined with the National Congress delegation, with an official of the Arab League acting as advisor to both delegations. When their turn came to speak before U.N.O., the Istiqlal delegation asked for immediate independence and asked that a U.N.O. Commission be appointed to supervise the transfer of power from the British Administration to the new government which would be set up. This latter proposal was approved by U.N.O., independence being deferred till 1952.

14.

Also during September, two members of the Istiqlal Party, Khalil NASSUF and Abdul Mojib KUBAR, went to Cairo to contact AZZAM Pasha and other Arab League notables. After the U.N.O. decision regarding Libya was made known these two, together with North African nationalist leaders, went to Abdin Palace to thank King Faruk for the part he and Egypt had played in supporting the Libyans' demand for independence.

15.

Meanwhile, in Tripolitania, the Istiqlal were encountering more and more opposition from the National Congress Party and from an increasing section of the Arab population on account of their pro-Italian sympathies. When the Istiqlal delegation to U.N.O. returned to Tripoli they were given a reception at party headquarters. A large crowd of their opponents gathered outside the premises and caused such a disturbance that police were obliged to disperse the crowd on two occasions.

16.

On January 1949 Matteo GALLIMBERTI committed suicide. A routine investigation into the circumstances of his death revealed certain papers of security interest. In consequence a thorough search was made of his flat and of his office, and documents were found showing without any shadow of doubt that he was receiving large sums of money from the Ministry of Italian Africa for an attempt to gain support for an Italian return. A statement of account for January 1950 shows MAL 1,500,000 (£3,125) as having been spent on the Istiqlal Party, whilst a letter dated August 1949 from the Ministry of Italian Africa authorised GALLIMBERTI to spend up to MAL 4,000,000 (£8,333) on financing the Party. There is, however, some uncertainty as to how much actually reached the party, since it was evident that

GALLIMBERTI/

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GALLIMBERTI had been misappropriating these funds and that he committed suicide on being called to account for them.

GALLIMBERTI's organization is believed to have been taken over by Dino CAFELLO, who is continuing his activities on a reduced scale.

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APPENDIX "A".

PERSONALITIES.

- (1) Salem Bey MUNTASSER.
- (2) Dr. Gaetano CHAPRON.
- (3) Matteo GALLIHERTI.
- (4) Alfonso MARCHESI.
- (5) Dino CAPELLO.
- (6) Demetrio CATANESE.
- (7) Angelo della VALLE.
- (8) Mukhtar MUNTASSER.
- (9) Ahmed Rassem bey KUBAR.
- (10) Matteo INGRAVALLE.
- (11) Tufiq GARIANI.
- ~~(12) Mohammed ben Ashur EDLUCA.~~

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APPENDIX "A".

PERSONALITIES.

(1) SALIM Bey MUNTASSER.

Born 1890 at Misurata, Tripolitania.
A man of elementary education who speaks Arabic only.
He served the Italian Government in Libya as semi-official adviser from 1911 until the Liberation in 1943.
In 1943 he was appointed member of the Chief Administrator's Arab Advisory Council. He was elected President of the United National Front (JEBHA) in 1946 but was dismissed in 1948 after he had started to establish secret contact with Italian agents.
MUNTASSER is prepared to co-operate with any foreign power provided his family prestige and his financial interests are safeguarded. He is regarded by the new generation as Traitor No. 1.

(2) Dr. GAETANO CHAPRON.

CHAPRON arrived in Tripoli in November 1946 as Repatriation Representative of the Ministry of Italian Africa to deal with the head for head exchange of Italians between the two countries. At the outset CHAPRON entertained lavishly and made every effort to ingratiate himself with senior members of the Administration. Through bribery and corruption he was able to establish an elaborate spy ring through which he is believed to have received, inter alia, copies of British Administration documents. CHAPRON was cordially disliked but greatly feared by the Italians in Tripolitania.

(3) Matteo GALLIMBERTI.

An Italian, aged about 52.
GALLIMBERTI is an official in the Ministry of Italian Africa and holds the appointment of Italian Repatriation Representative in Tripolitania. He arrived in Tripoli in June 1948 and since that date has directed the political intrigue of the Ministry of Italian Africa in its effort to re-establish Italian influence in Tripolitania. GALLIMBERTI committed suicide on 11th January 1950, presumably because he was being called to account for the disbursement of funds received from the Ministry of Italian Africa.

(4) ALFONSO MARCHESI.

Born in Sicily MARCHESI is a lawyer
by profession. He is also the Tripolitania

correspondent of/

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ALFONSO MARCHESE (Cont'd):

correspondent of A.I.D.I. (Agenzia Italiana di Informazione). MARCHESE is reported to have admitted in September 1948 that he had been converted to communism. At that time his propaganda activities had reached such a pitch that the Administration suggested to him, indirectly, that he leave the country. This he did, and returned in December 1948. He was then said to be employed by the Italian Ministry of African Colonies as a Counsellor, but no confirmation of this has been obtained. In May 1949 MARCHESE announced his intention of retiring from politics, it is thought as a result of a warning by GALLIHERTI, to whom the Administration had spoken strongly regarding the danger to public security arising from the activities of certain Italian agents. MARCHESE, however, is believed still to be actively engaged in spreading pro-Italian propaganda.

(5) DINO CAPELLO.

Born 1912 at Syracuse, CAPELLO is a lawyer by profession. He was an officer in the Italian Army until 1939 and was Deputy Prefect of Misurata prior to the British occupation of Tripolitania. In 1943 subject was appointed "Residente" at Crippi and in that capacity was suspected of embezzling monies with which he should have paid farmers. He was the leading Italian agent in the Eastern Province for some years and in January 1949 he moved to Tripoli, where he shared an office with Alfonso MARCHESE (see Personality Note No. 4). CAPELLO was thereafter active in Italian intrigue to regain control of Tripolitania and is known to have attempted to foster discontent amongst the natives in August 1949, when he visited provincial centres in his professional capacity. At the end of November 1949 CAPELLO left for Italy on urgent private affairs. It is believed that CAPELLO continued the work of GALLIHERTI after the latter's suicide.

(6) GIUSEPPE CATANESE.

Born April 1912 at Reggio di Calabria, Italy. From 1932 - 1936 CATANESE was a Corporal in the Italian Army, subsequently became a Sergeant in P.A.I. (Polizia Africana Italiana) - (the Italian counter-intelligence organisation) - and a member of the "Polizia Venatoria" (Forest Guards/Game Wardens). In 1942 CATANESE was invalided out on account of injuries sustained during an air raid and he then set up as a public writer in Tripoli. His office later became responsible for the payment of War Damage Claims and came under the supervision of GALLIHERTI of the Ministry of Italian Africa. It was later (December 1949) reported that CATANESE was working under the direction of Conte della CROCE, the local representative of the Italian Foreign Office. CATANESE's

assignment was/

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assignment was reported to consist of:-

- (a) advising the ISTIQLAL on matters of policy and recruitment.
- (b) undermining, through his agents, the popularity of the National Congress, and
- (c) discrediting, through his agents, the British Administration in the eyes of the Arabs.

(7) ANGELO della VALLE.

Born in Rome in 1905. He is a storekeeper by occupation, having previously served in the Italian Army as a Corporal and later as a Militia subaltern employed in an ordnance depot in Tripoli. After the British occupation della VALLE was employed as estate manager for an Italian but was prosecuted by him for misappropriation of funds. della VALLE was declared bankrupt. In 1947, 8 and 9, subject worked at the general wholesale market in Tripoli, devoting his spare time to distributing money to Libyan ex-servicemen on behalf of Italian agents. In May 1949 della VALLE went to Italy and is still there, it is believed employed by the Ministry of Italian Africa.

(8) Muktar Ahmad Hassan MUNTASSER.

Born Misurata, Tripolitania, in 1910. A member of the influential MUNTASSER family and nephew of Salem Bey MUNTASSER. During the Italian regime in Libya Muktar MUNTASSER was employed as an advisor on Arab affairs and has acquired an Italian manner and way of living. Shortly after the British occupation of Libya, Muktar was employed as Secretary of Arab Affairs at Garian and rendered good service in that capacity until, in August, 1945, he "resigned" following a report that he was accepting bribes from local notables. In January 1948 he was re-employed by B.M.A. after intercession on his behalf by SALEM Bey. He now holds the position of Secretary of Arab Affairs at Cussabat. He has lately been on leave without pay in order to represent the ISTIQLAL, of which he has been a member since its inception, at U.N.O. Although Muktar MUNTASSER wields some influence owing to his family connections he is not very popular with local Arabs on account of his known pro-Italian sympathies.

Rassam Bey KUBAR/

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(9) Rassem Bey KUBAR (or COOMAR).

Born in Garian, Tripolitania, circa 1890. During the Turkish rule, KUBAR was a Civil Secretary. In the early days of the Italian occupation the KUBAR family fought against the Italians, one member being condemned to death, one fleeing to Turkey and Rassem taking refuge in Tunis. Rassem was later pardoned by the Italians and in 1937 was appointed Chief of Gendarmerie. He held no office under the British Administration until 1947, when he was appointed adviser to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, Central Province. He was a member of the United National Front (JEMHA) but was dismissed from that organisation on account of his pro-Italian attitude. Local political circles believe him to be a blind follower of Salom Bey MUNTASSER. During the May 1949 demonstrations against the Devin-Sforza plan KUBAR was singled out for attack by the demonstrators.

(10) Matteo INGRAVALLE.

Born 1891 at Disceglia (Bari), Italy. At present a concession holder by occupation. INGRAVALLE is known to have joined the Fascist Party in 1920 and took part in the March on Rome in 1922. He has a long record of official appointments in Tripoli under the Fascist regime. In 1948 INGRAVALLE went to Italy in connection with the affairs of the Libyan Disabled Ex-Servicemen's Association ("MUTILATI DI GUERRA"), of which he was nominated President. He was prominent in the foundation of the Hizb ol ISTIQLAL and has been active in the dissemination of pro-Italian propaganda since 1948.

(11) Mohammed Tufik ol GARIANI.

Born at Garian, Tripolitania, in 1898. In 1923 he fled from the Italians and took refuge in Egypt, where his wife and two children still reside. GARIANI returned to Tripoli in August 1946, where, after addressing a meeting of the KUTLA Party, he was the guest of Salom Bey MUNTASSER. From 1947 to January 1949 GARIANI was again in Egypt, although it was reported that he was a member of the United National Front in Tripolitania during that time. After his return to Tripoli in January 1949 GARIANI appears to have swung over to a pro-Italian point of view, and he was prominent in spreading pro-Italian propaganda in the Central Province. Following the

attempt to/

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Mohammed Tufik el GARIANI. (Cont'd):

attempt to form a Congress at Garian in opposition to the National Congress GARIANI was threatened by youths of this latter organisation and left for Egypt. He returned in September, having in the interim despatched pamphlets to Tripoli calling upon Libyans to unite and demand the re-integration of the former Libya, resorting to violence if necessary. A certain amount of friction is said to exist between GARIANTI and Salem Bey MUNTASSER at the moment owing to the failure of the latter to offer the former the secretaryship of the ISTIQLAL which GARIANI expected.

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Appendix "2"

Central Committee of Hizb el ISTIQLAL

Salem Bey MUNTASSER	President
Haj Khalil Nasuf	Treasurer
Abdalla Bey SHLWIF	Secretary
Abdulmajid COOBAR	Comptroller
Rasem Bey COOBAR	Member
Prof. Kamel el KAFMALI	"
Sheikh Ahmed Bey CHIRZA	"
Ali Bey Ben SHABAN	"
Mohamed Bey ben Hsan MUNTASSER	"
Isaui BULANJER	"
Mohamed bey Abdussamad NAMS	"
Abdalla ben MATUGH	"
Abdalla LAJELI	"
Ali Sassi MSAM	"
Abdalla ben HECDA	"
Sheikh Abada MAHJUB	"

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Appendix "C"

Articles of Association

I. Preamble

As a result of recent international movements following the decision of the U.N.O; after examining the actual situation; after studying matters regarding our future; to fulfil the duty of every citizen to achieve for his country freedom and democracy; and to give expression to the wishes of many sections of the inhabitants of Tripolitania; there has been organised a political party to be known as the "Hisb al Istiqlal" (Independence Party).

II. Objects

Its objects are:-

First: To achieve for Libya Unity, its 1938 boundaries, complete independence, and an Arab national democratic government.

Secondly: To achieve for it membership of the Arab League.

III. Constitution

Article 1. The party shall have two committees - a Central Admin. Committee and a General Committee.

Article 2. The Central Committee shall consist of not more than 21 members and not less than 11 members - to include a president, a general secretary, a treasurer, and an administrative secretary.

Article 3. The General Committee shall consist of the members of the Central Committee and the presidents of the branch committees mentioned in Article 17.

Article 4. The General Committee has the right to elect the president, the vice-president, the general secretary, and the treasurer. The Central Committee will elect the administrative secretary.

Article 5. All members must be nationalists, and of good character and mature age.

Article 6. The Central Committee shall meet every week and the General Committee every three months as from the lapse of the year of the 'Flight of the Prophet'; when notices of meeting are issued the agenda shall be included.

Article 7. The President may convene an extraordinary meeting of members whenever he thinks necessary.

Article 8. A quorum for a meeting shall consist of a bare majority.

Article 9. When a difference of opinion among members shall arise the matter shall be decided on a majority of votes - the president giving a casting vote in the event of a tie.

Article 10. In the absence of the President the Vice-President shall preside and thereafter the oldest member present.

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Appendix "C" (Contd.)

- 2 -

Article 11. The Central Committee is empowered to dispose of all urgent and ordinary business of the party. But, in matters of importance the decision of the Central Committee is necessary.

Article 12. The Central Committee must circulate between the meetings the minutes of its last meeting to the General Committee for approval.

Article 13. The President may modify an Agenda, convene meetings, and institute discussions, sign petitions and important communications, execute the decisions of the Committee, represent the party on all official occasions, and deal with urgent matters including matters for which the expenditure of not more than 10,000 M.A.L. is involved - provided he informs the Committee at its next meeting.

Article 14. The General Secretary shall keep copies of reports, petitions, telegrams, letters and agenda. He may sign letters and invitations with the consent of the President. At meetings he will record the minutes.

Article 15. All other administrative work shall be delegated to the administrative secretary. He will be responsible for the custody of all the party's documents, registers, correspondence, and furniture. He shall not disclose information gleaned in his capacity as secretary to anyone other than the members without the approval of the Committee and the President. He shall act as assistant to the General Secretary.

Article 16. The Administrative Secretary will be paid a monthly salary from the funds of the party for his administrative work. He shall not attend meetings at which his salary is being discussed.

Article 17. The party may organise branches in those parts of the territory and elsewhere which support it and adhere to its principles.

Article 18. The Central Committee, and also the branches, shall keep records of the names of supporters and members.

Article 19. The President of the Central Committee or the Vice-President will control all the activities of such branches. Every branch shall submit to the Central Committee information as required.

Article 20. The Central Committee shall nominate one of its members to control all the branches in the territory.

Article 21. The Central Committee shall communicate to the branches all its actions and proposals.

Article 22. Every president of every branch may attend meetings of the Central Committee as a spectator.

Article 23. The funds of the party and those of its branches will be derived from donations from members, and inhabitants of the territory.

Article 24. Money accumulated by the party shall be deposited with the Central Committee. No expenditure shall be incurred without the prior approval of the Central Committee except as provided by Article 13. Receipts by the General Treasurer or the Treasurers of branches shall be given for money received for the fund. Branches however may retain a reserve of cash to meet current expenditure.

Nº 007069

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Appendix "C" (Contd.)

- 3 -

Article 25. The Treasurer shall submit a balance-sheet at each General Meeting. The General Committee may modify decisions regarding expenditure in the interests of the party as it thinks necessary.

Article 26. No member shall use party funds or the party's name for his own personal ends. Whosoever does shall be dismissed from the party.

Article 27. Whenever a member acts contrary to the principles of the party, or divulges anything secret which has been discussed at meetings, he shall be dismissed.

Article 28. All letters and communications intended for the party shall be addressed to the Central Headquarters. The General Secretary shall bring such to the notice of the President before meetings.

Article 29. The party will publish a newspaper to serve its interests, and to publicise its aims. There is no objection to this receiving assistance from experts provided expenditure can be met from the funds and all profits go to the funds.

Article 30. The party shall organise other committees as it thinks necessary.

Article 31. After the foregoing Articles of Association have been submitted to, and approved by the majority of the General Committee, they will be considered as operative. Every member shall then give the following oath - I swear in the name of GOD and on my honour and on the honour of my sacred country to be faithful to the principles of the party viz:- to work for the independence of a united Libya within its natural boundaries as before World War II; complete independence with an Arab Democratic Constitutional National Government; and membership of such a Libyan Government within the Arab League.

Article 32. The General Committee may by the approval of a majority of members modify these Articles of Association as it thinks necessary.

Nº 007136

TOP SECRET

Pro-Italian Organisation Chart

Dr. G. CHAPRON
(Representative of Ministry of Italian Africa)

ARAB ACTION COMMITTEE

Ibrahim GRITLI Besir GARIANI
Ramadan GRITLI Fubaker NAAM
Sheikh Mohamed ARTIGH
Sheikh Mohamed DUWI

ITALIAN ACTION COMMITTEE

Conte SOTTO CASA MANIERI
Alfonso MARCHESE LATTANZI
GIUSTI MUCCIO (Treasurer Italian Red Cross)
Admiral FENZI Conte DELLA CROCE
Padre ILLUMINATO

ARAB NOTABLES

Salen MUNTASSER
Mahmed MUNTASSER
Ibrahim SHAWBAN
Mustafa KIZRAN

PROVINCIAL CENTRES

(1)

ITALIAN EX-SERVICE- SERVICEMEN	ARAB EX-SERVICE- MEN'S ASSOCIATION (MUTILATI) (2)	UFFICIO MEDALGIC (M. INGRAVALLE)	COMITATO REPRESNTATIVO ITALIANO (Adml. FENZI)	CIRCOLO ITALIA	ILLIAN RED CROSS (3)	ITALIAN COURTS
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ECONOMIC FRONT
(D. CATTITI)

ITALIAN POLITICAL
ASSOCIATION FOR
THE PROGRESS OF LIBYA
(E. CIBELLI)

NOTES

Offices are scattered throughout Tripoli. No meetings are held twice in the same place.
(1), (2) & (3) control and unknown number of agents who operate in the provinces and in Tripoli.

TOP SECRET

Nº 007037

15a
EXTRACT from Foreign Office file J.10112/9 received 6.5.50.

For SF.92/Italy/N.Africa.

COPY.

(This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on).

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ROME

No. 306

14th February, 1950.

D: 5.55. a.m. 15th February, 1950.

Repeated to Tripoli No.71 Asmara No.89 Addis Ababa No.146
Saying to Washington No.767 B.M.E.O. (Cairo) No.126 Benghazi No.16
and Paris No.569.

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Rome telegram No.306 of 14th February,
repeated for information to Tripoli, Asmara and Addis Ababa and
Saying to Washington British Middle East Office (Cairo) Benghazi
and Paris.

My immediately preceding telegram. —14a

Following are the requests made to the Italian Government:-

1. That the Italian Government should issue categorical instructions to their representatives of every class and grade in Eritrea and Tripolitania that they should henceforth desist from all kinds of intervention direct or indirect in the local politics of the territories.
2. That Italian Government officials in Eritrea and Tripolitania acquire their funds through regular banking channels and confine their expenditure to strictly official purposes and, except with the knowledge and consent of the British Administration, make no payments for "charitable" or other purposes to non-Italian nationals.
3. That the legitimate functions of Dr. Callimberti's Repatriation Office should be transferred to Signor Caya.
4. The responsibility for the offices of the "Danni di Guerra" and the "Mutilati di Guerra" should at once be transferred to Signor Caya and that their activities should henceforward be confined to the legitimate purposes for which they were established.
5. That the Italian Government should at once arrange for the return to Italy of the following persons who are implicated in Dr. Callimberti's improper activities, i.e., Sigg, Catanese, Marchese, Manera, Cappelo and Giusti.

OS/IEP
24/5/50

7.6. F.O. 16112/9
R. 2. 16.5.50
OUTFILE 14a

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP.
Secret.

FOREIGN OFFICE DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ROME

No. 305

11th February, 1950.

D. 5.55 a.m. 15th February, 1950.

Repeated to Tripoli No. 70
Addis Ababa No. 115.

Asmara No. 88.

Saving to Washington No. 766
Benghazi No. 15.

E.M.E.O. (Cairo) No. 125.
Paris No. 568.

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Rome telegram No. 305 of 11th February repeated for information to Tripoli, Asmara, Addis Ababa and Saving to Washington, British Middle East Office (Cairo), Benghazi and Paris.

Tripoli despatch No. 12 of 26th January: Dr. Gallimberti.

The Italian Minister was asked to call at the Foreign Office on 11th February and was reminded that in the past frequent complaints had been made to the Italian Government of the use made of political bribery by their representatives in both Tripolitania and Eritrea. His Majesty's Government's complaints had sometimes been brushed aside as unfounded or it had been claimed that the sums spent were infinitesimal. Signor d'Ajeta was in particular reminded of Mr. Ward's conversation with Count Zoppi last August.

2. When Dr. Gallimberti had committed suicide he had left behind him a note which indicated clearly to the police that he was engaged not merely in bribery in the territory, but in financial transactions which were flagrant violations of the exchange control regulations. The police had then quite rightly investigated his papers and from these it was apparent that Dr. Gallimberti had received from the Italian Government through the Ministry of Italian Africa but without passing through the exchanges, sums of money

/of which approximately

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 305 TO ROME

-2-

of which approximately 27 million Mal (approximately £50,000) was on record and that on instructions from the Italian Government, the MEE spent part of it for the purpose of organising and sustaining a pro-Italian movement amongst the Tripolitanian Arabs. One of the most important documents found bore the signature of Signor Brisasoa, the Under-Secretary in charge of the Ministry of Italian Africa. We could not however accept any plea that Dr. Gallimberti's activities were the responsibility of that particular Ministry because other documents bearing the signature of so high an official as Count Zoppi showed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were perfectly well aware of what was going on. Moreover Dr. Gallimberti had been under instructions to copy all his communications to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as to the Ministry of Italian Africa.

3. In his activities Dr. Gallimberti had been aided and abetted by certain Italians in Tripolitania. Some of the illegal exchange transactions had been conducted through the Consorzio Agrario, an institution the expansion of whose activities Count Sforza had only recently urged us to permit.

4. These improper activities of Italian officials in the former Italian colonies were regarded in the most serious light by His Majesty's Government and they must henceforward cease not merely in Tripolitania but in Eritrea as well. We were perfectly well aware that, despite our representations, Count Gropello had not desisted from the practices about which we complained. Indeed, ugly reports had reached us that his practices were extending beyond the boundaries of Eritrea into another country. Despite the Italian Government's earlier protestations to the contrary Gallimberti's improper activities had now been proved

/and it was.....

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 305 TO ROME

-3-

and it was difficult therefore to take at their face value denials that Gropello's activities were innocent.

5. On the other hand His Majesty's Government did not wish this matter serious as it was, to affect Anglo-Italian relations or stultify the growing spirit of Anglo-Italian cooperation in African affairs. They realised that were the incriminating documents to become public the greatest damage would be done to Italian interests in such quarters as the United Nations. Moreover in view of Signor Brusasca's responsibility for the sums of money which Dr. Gallimberti had apparently embezzled their disclosure might not be without repercussions in Italian political circles. It was for this reason that no legal proceedings had so far repeat so far been taken against certain individual Italians in Tripolitania implicated in the affair since these proceedings would inevitably lead to disclosure of the documents. On the other hand His Majesty's Government were amply justified in insisting on certain action on the part of the Italian Government which if taken would result not in a deterioration of Anglo-Italian relations but in the removal of one of the causes of friction so far as the former Italian colonies were concerned.

6. Signor d'Ajeta was then given to read the summary of the documents found in Dr. Gallimberti's flat and the photostatic copies of the documents contained in Tripoli despatch under reference. After he had made a number of notes, he was handed a written statement of five requests which His Majesty's Government had to make to the Italian Government as regards the future conduct of their officials in Kertoua and Tripolitania. (See my immediately following telegram for text). He was told that while we had deliberately avoided formulating these requests and the grounds for them in an official note an early and satisfactory reply was expected.

7. Signor d'Ajeta

SECRET

MISSION OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 205 TO ROME

7. Signor d'Ajeta said little beyond expressing his personal opinion that Dr. Gallimberti's activities belonged to a past period when the Italian Government doubted the sincerity of British assurances regarding Italian interests in Tripolitania and elsewhere. He did however without prompting mention with apparent disapproval the relationship between Dr. Gallimberti and the French Consul-General. He was informed that we were aware of this relationship though not that we were aware of Dr. Gallimberti's use of the French flag.

8. The conversation though naturally unpleasant was in no way unfriendly and its frankness was in accord with the relationship which has been established with Signor d'Ajeta.

RRRRR

Received 6.5.50 25.5.50

CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR
BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
TRIPOLITANIA

JT 10/12/10

SECRET.

2nd. February 1950.

Despatch No. 15.

9/20/50

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 12 of 26th. January 1950 I have the honour to submit a further report on documents found in the late Dr. Gallimberti's residence. The documents dealt with in the present despatch are not directly concerned with Dr. Gallimberti's financial transactions but are of considerable interest as disclosing in a more general way the propaganda and intelligence activities carried out in this territory at the direction of the Italian government.

2. The papers under review amount to several thousand pages of closely typewritten Italian and in the time so far available for their examination it has not been possible to analyse them in great detail. A good idea has however been obtained of their general character and notice has been taken of particular items that appear to be of salient interest.

3. The documents, which cover the period from 25th. August 1947 to 29th. December 1949 consist for the most part of reports to Rome on the local political situation by Dr. Gallimberti and his predecessor Dr. Chapron. The majority of these reports are addressed to Dr. Lucio Egamutti of the Ministry of Italian Africa.

A second and smaller category comprises documents addressed to Dr. Gallimberti and Dr. Chapron from the Ministry of Italian Africa and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome. Many of the latter are signed personally by Count Zoppi.

There are in addition various papers which do not fall into the above two categories including correspondence between Dr. Gallimberti and other persons in Tripoli, and reports submitted to him by his agents.

4. With regard to the first group of documents - the reports from Tripoli to Rome - the most striking thing about them is their quantity. I had never been in much doubt that under the guise of a "Repatriation Mission" the representative of the Ministry of Italian Africa in Tripoli had been carrying on various intelligence and propaganda activities in the interests of the Italian government but the extent and ramifications of these activities are shown to be much greater than had been suspected. Throughout this period of over two years, reports were submitted to Rome, at times daily and on the average at least two or three times a week, covering the whole field of political intelligence and illustrating to an astonishing degree the intensity of effort in the Italian cause. The conversations and opinions of Administration officials, contacts and activities of pro-Italian Arabs throughout the territory, gossip from Cairo and Benghazi, information obtained from the French Consul, internal preoccupations of the local Italian community, - all are recorded with a wealth of readable if tendentious detail.

His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
London S.W.1.

/2.

CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR
BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
TRIPOLITANIA

2.

5. The second striking feature about these reports is the consistently anti-British (and more particularly anti-administration) feeling which they evince. This again we had expected but not quite to the degree which has now been revealed. Whether because their contacts with Arabs were almost entirely with the pro-Italian minority or whether it was merely from wishful thinking, there is little doubt that Dr. Callimberti and Dr. Chapron before him considerably over-estimated the extent of pro-Italian sympathy in Tripolitania. One result of this has been the view (which they seem to have imparted to most Italian politicians and journalists) that it is only British malevolence which stands in the way of a complete Italo-Arab understanding. Whenever 'the English' are mentioned it is in a tone of distrust or disparagement and to our simplest actions the most complicated and unlikely political motives are ascribed. (Mr. Clutton's visit to Malut and Misra last August was said, for example, to be in order to spread propaganda against Bashir Saadawi and in favour of the Senussi amirate.)

Occasionally a distinction is drawn between the policy of His Majesty's Government and that of the Administration and we in Tripoli are accused of sabotaging any well-intentioned move. In this frame of mind Dr. Callimberti will clutch at any straw of comfort and the arrival of Mr. Penney or a visit of Brigadier Raney is greeted as a sign that our sins have found us out. Similarly when any of my officers goes on leave it is either to answer to the Foreign Office for his misdeeds or else to fix up a job for himself prior to his impending dismissal.

6. Quite apart from the anti-British obsession and nationalistic fervour which distort and falsify the general picture drawn in these reports, their quality from the intelligence point of view is by no means equal to their quantity. Conversations are usually quite faithfully reported, comment and criticism is sometimes penetrating and an efficient service was clearly maintained for the pooling of political information. Deductions drawn from such information are often, however, very wide of the mark and there are many errors of fact which it would not have taken much application or acumen to correct.

7. Turning from the general to the particular it is impossible at this stage to furnish a detailed analysis of all these documents and I propose instead to give a list of the main subjects covered together with some examples of the way in which they have been treated. Further reports can then be submitted at your request on any aspect in which you may be particularly interested.

The most convenient classification of this material may be as follows:

(a) Documents illustrative of Italian methods of propaganda within the territory.

This is the largest single category and includes detailed accounts of contacts and negotiations with local pro-Italian Arabs (Saleh Muntasser, Ibrahim Sha'ban, Ahmed Ghirza, Abdulla Sherif, Khalifa Khaled, Abdessalam Sallahi, to mention only a few

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CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR
BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
TRIPOLITANIA

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out of the many names which occur). These papers also describe the pressure brought to bear on prominent men of moderate views such as Taher Caramanli, as well as negotiations conducted (not always unsuccessfully) with extreme Arab Nationalists e.g. of the Kutla party. They provide a clear and somewhat disturbing picture of the intensity of Italian efforts and of the means employed by Dr. Gallimberti and his associates to achieve their objects. Many illuminating details are recorded of their activities during periods of particular stress, (e.g. the visit of the Four Power commission, the municipal elections and the meetings of the United Nations Assembly,) culminating in their organization of the Istiqlal (Independence) party and the despatch of its delegation to Lake Success.

(b) Political intelligence reports of a general character. These are mainly concerned with the attitudes and opinions of Arab politicians both inside and outside the territory and with the activities, real and alleged, of myself and my political staff. They include information gleaned from Cyrenaica and Egypt and contain many interesting references to Bashir Saadawi and to Assam Pasha. Reports were also made on the strength and disposition of British troops in Tripolitania.

X/1/ (c) Notes indicative of the relationship (at one time cordial) between Dr. Gallimberti and the French Consul. Until recent months a good deal of information seems to have been exchanged and liaison was particularly close in matters affecting the tribal and desert areas bordering on the Fessan. There is also evidence that French Consular facilities were used for the transmission of information. (see para. 8 below).

(d) Documents showing evidence of what in time of war, at least, would be called "Espionage". The most interesting of these is a note by Dr. Chapron dated 4th. June 1948 to the effect that he has inserted one of his agents named Pietro Fina in the office of the Defence Security Officer. (According to Article 1 (f) of Proclamation No. 104 this offence would appear to be still punishable by death). Other papers (none of them of recent date) refer to confidential documents obtained by stealth from the administration, including a copy of Lt. Colonel Sandison's memorandum on Italian Rule in Africa. (There is no conclusive proof as to how this document was obtained though there is an indication of some leakage in this connection from within the Government Press.)

(e) Evidence of interference regarding the conduct, posting etc. of government officials.

Such interference is of various kinds. In one case an Italian official of the Administration is persuaded to submit a report to Dr. Gallimberti (later forwarded to Rome) criticising the affairs of the department in which he is working.

In another case a pro-Italian Arab official is persuaded to advise his Provincial Commissioner to transfer a subordinate official from one area in his province to another.

More significantly, the decision to break up the Southern Desert Area as an Administrative unit and the subsequent resignation of Captain Tower are hailed as an important success of Italian 'diplomacy'.

CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR
BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
TRIPOLITANIA

4.

(2) Documents concerning the internal politics of the Italian community in Tripolitania.

Various references are made to the Bishop of Tripoli and to the Communist Alvare Felici (who is not taken at all seriously) but the most frequent as well as the most interesting reports in this category are those dealing with the activities of Dr. Cibelli and his party. Dr. Cibelli was obviously a thorn in the side of orthodox Italian policy here and it is possible that a further study of these papers will throw additional light on certain of his doings.

The close identification of the Italian government with the local 'Comitato Rappresentativo Italiano' is confirmed and in one instance Dr. Gallimberti is congratulated on "your article in the Corriere di Tripoli, appearing over the signature of Count Sottocasa."

8. Of the correspondence addressed to Dr. Gallimberti from Rome the most interesting are the financial instructions of which copies have already been sent to you with my despatch No. 12.

The remainder of this correspondence is of lesser importance and consists mainly of replies and instructions to Dr. Gallimberti on miscellaneous topics (e.g. the Istiqlal party's delegation to Lake Success), queries as to his conduct of local affairs and items for his information with regard to Arabs visiting Italy.

Some light is thrown, however, on the relationship over all these matters between the Ministry of Italian Africa and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From the summer of 1949 onwards an increasing proportion of Dr. Gallimberti's correspondence comes to him from the latter Ministry and most of it is signed by Count Zoppi himself. For some time previously copies of all Dr. Gallimberti's reports were to be addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it would appear that in April 1949 the French Consul in Tripoli was requested by the Palazzo Chigi to put his bag (and perhaps cipher) facilities at Dr. Gallimberti's disposal. This means of communication was probably employed for some months but on September 13th, instructions were received to send all future correspondence to Rome through Signor Gaja.

It seems likely therefore that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must have been conversant with most if not all of Dr. Gallimberti's activities and, although Count Zoppi's own communications to Tripoli reveal no indiscretion, the knowledge that he must have possessed renders his reaction to Mr. Ward's protest last August all the more surprising (see Rome telegram No. 1067 of August 27th, 1949).

9. As indicated in paragraph 2 above, the present appreciation is based on a first reading of the large amount of material which has come to light. Further details, with supporting documents, can be furnished later if you so desire.

10. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome, to the British Resident in Benghazi and to the British Middle East Office in Cairo.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

T.R. Blackley

(T.R. Blackley.)

original in F.O. File
No. J.1042/9.50.
Rec. 6.5.50.

12a

- Document No. 1. Letter to Dr. Gallimberti from Rome asking for a minimum and maximum estimate of expenses to be incurred.
2. Typed estimate submitted by Gallimberti to Rome for the constitution of the Independence Party covering a period of six months. This Party was formed in June 1949. (Photostat copy attached 2A).
3. Typed minimum monthly estimate for the financing and the constitution of the Independence Party (Photostat copy attached 3A).
4. Authority from the Ministry of Italian Africa with the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the expenditure of 4,000,000 Italian Lire (Photostat copy attached 4A).
5. Unsigned typed receipt for Gallimberti's signature to the effect that he had received MAL 1,482,275, equivalent to 4,940,916 Italian Lire from a certain Signor Bardo Bardi, Consorzio Agrario representative in Italy (Photostat copy attached 5A).
6. Memo which gives details that the Independence Party has in fact received 4 million Italian Lire besides the expenses for the despatch of the delegation to Lake Success and Cairo. It appears from this note that it was the Italian Government's intention to hold up payments to the Libyan ex-Servicemen and to use them for political purposes during the Election (Photostat copy attached 6A).
7. Estimate of expenditure for the month of December 1949 which includes details of the amount to be paid to the Independence Party. Clear indication that the main functions of the repatriation office were political. (Photostat copy attached 7A).
8. Estimate of expenditure for the month of January 1950 (Photostat copy attached 8A).
9. Financial statement covering the early part of 1948 whilst Dr. Chapron was in office prior to Dr. Gallimberti's arrival, probably drawn up by Carlo Giusti, head of the Consorzio Agrario in Tripolitania for his signature, and that of Raffaele Muccio. Although this document is not signed subsequent documents bear both persons signature. (Photostat copy attached 9A).
10. Signed statement dated 1st July 1948 to the effect that 8,263,992 Italian Lire, equivalent to MAL 2,376,130 had been transferred to the account of Signor Carlo Giusti (Photostat copy attached 10A).
11. A further signed statement dated 1st July 1948 to the effect that 1,500,000 Italian Lire equivalent to MAL 442,500 had been transferred to Signor Carlo Giusti (Photostat copy attached 11A).
12. Further signed statement that 18,300,000 Italian Lire equivalent to MAL 4,959,500 had been transferred in varying amounts between 15th March 1948 and 30th March

12. Letter No. 83186 dated 25th February 1949 signed by Brusasca addressed to Dr. M. Gallimberti instructing him as to the financial procedure to be adopted and laying down that any payments over and above MAL 150,000 must first have the approval of the Director General of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Africa. Amounts less than MAL 150,000 should have the approval of a Committee consisting of Conte Della Croce, Dott. Mariani and Dott. Gallimberti (Photostat copy attached 15A).
13. Further signed statement that 7,000,000 Italian Lire equivalent to MAL 2,101,692 had been transferred in varying amounts between 5th April and 14th April 1948 by Emilio Mucio at the request of Signor Giusti (Photostat copy attached 13A).
14. Detailed account covering the period 21st February 1948 to 30th June 1948 of varying sums of money paid to Arabs who are known for their pro-Italian sympathies. Total amount paid out MAL 12,861,485. (Photostat copy attached 14A).
15. Letter No. 83186 dated 25th February 1949 signed by Brusasca addressed to Dr. M. Gallimberti instructing him as to the financial procedure to be adopted and laying down that any payments over and above MAL 150,000 must first have the approval of the Director General of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Africa. Amounts less than MAL 150,000 should have the approval of a Committee consisting of Conte Della Croce, Dott. Mariani and Dott. Gallimberti (Photostat copy attached 15A).
16. A further letter dated 16th May 1949 signed by Brusasca calling for accounts to be submitted countersigned by Moreno (Photostat copy attached 16A).
17. A d/o. letter dated 6th July 1949 from Moreno to Gallimberti suggesting that he should take advantage of Alessandrini's visit to Tripoli to hand him the accounts which were by this time long-overdue.
18. A private letter dated 18th July 1949 to Gallimberti from Alessandrini thanking him for his hospitality.
19. A further letter No. 83780/22 of 23rd July 1949 reminding Gallimberti of his responsibilities and reprimanding him for his casualness.
20. A letter No. 93532 dated 23rd September 1949 from Moreno to Gallimberti severely reprimanding him for not submitting the accounts (Photostat copy attached 20A).
21. Further letter suggesting that no accounts have been submitted since July 1949 since when the Italian Government admitted having remitted 18 million Italian Lire (Photostat copy attached No. 21A).
22. A letter from a certain Bashir Ismael appealing for more money.
23. Manuscript note from a certain Hascimi Bahi requesting payment.
24. Pagnutti who is Director General of the Political Bureau in the Ministry of African Colonies authorizes Gallimberti in writing to pay Dott. Cappello, Dott. Manera and Dott. Marchese a monthly subsidy of MAL 10,000 out of the funds at his disposal for their activities (Photostat copy attached 24A).
25. Signed Statement of accounts by Dott. Cappello claiming

a refund of MAL 122,580. Carlo Giusti advanced MAL 40,000 in Gallimberti's absence (Photostat copy attached 25A).

26. A letter from a certain Hamed Akrial claiming financial remuneration which was promised to him by Marchese.
27. A note from Cappello and Marchese asking Gallimberti for a refund of money paid out by them amounting to MAL 116,250.
28. A note from Pagnutti to Gallimberti recommending that a subsidy should be paid to a certain Khalifa Subakr el Orgi from Barce, Cyrenaica.
29. A note from Pagnutti passing on a request made by Della Croce for a monthly subsidy to be paid to three Arabs employed in this Administration.
30. A note from Della Croce to Gallimberti asking for the allowances to be paid amounting to MAL 60,000.
31. A letter from Marchese to a certain Mukta ben Beshir ben Orman who was sentenced to four years imprisonment, asking he be paid the sum of MAL 10,000 for professional services as a lawyer.
32. A letter from a certain Arab named Mohamed ben Sciama asking for MAL 50,000 as a remuneration for having spread pro-Italian propaganda.
33. A letter from Pagnutti to Gallimberti recommending payment of MAL 30,000 to Beshir Gariani who he claimed had been badly treated in Italy.
34. A typed note for Dott. Gaja recommending the payment of MAL 30,000 to three S.A. Arabs officials who were dismissed by the British Administration.
35. A letter from Pagnutti to Gallimberti requesting him to continue the payment of the son of a certain Hassan Iesud who lives in Italy and has broadcast over the wireless.
36. A pro memoria for Dr. Gallimberti unsigned and undated.
37. A list of persons who worked for the Italian Electoral Committee during the Municipal Elections in January 1949.
38. List of payments to leaders of the Independence Party's rural branches amounting to MAL 24,250.
39. List of payments to various persons.
40. List of payments to various Cyrenaicans passing through Tripolitania.
41. List of payments to various persons.
42. List of payments to various persons.
43. A signed declaration by Gallimberti to the effect that he received a loan from a certain Jew named Giuseppe Bardo of MAL 500,000 dated 13th December 1948. A further endorsement at the bottom of the note confirms

repayment signed by the said Giuseppe Barba dated 3rd February 1949. Giuseppe Barba was interviewed by the Police on 18th January and confirmed the facts (Photostat copy attached 43A).

- 44. A letter No. 83692/22 of 6th July 1949 from Pagnutti regarding the distribution of 10,000,000 Italian Lire to ex-soldiers (Photostat copy attached 44A).
- 45. Unsigned note dealing with transfer of currency.
- 46. Note dated 7th July 1949 from Pagnutti to Gallimberti re transfer of 10,000,000 Italian Lire refers to letter No. 83692/22 of 6th July 1949.
- 47. Personal note from Pagnutti to Gallimberti referring to a payment of 500,000 Italian Lire to a certain Mohamed Senussi ben Sciarif el Gariani mentioning the Consorzio Agrario as the Agency through whom the remittance had been made.
- 48. A letter No. 83964/31 dated 27th August 1949 from Moreno requesting explanation as to disposal of 500,000 Lire to Abdul Salem Salabi (Photostat copy attached 48A).
- 49. 237 separate receipts signed by Arabs and various political agents amounting to a total of MAL 4,013,297.
- 50. 129 unsigned payment notes made out in favour of various Arabs to a total of MAL 1,151,100.

Tripoli.
24th January 1950.

See attached page for further list of financial documents.

Further List of Financial Documents
found in Dr. Gallimberti's Flat.

51. A note from Moreno to Gallimberti dated 30th July 1949, requesting a more detailed estimate in respect of the financing of the "Isitigial" Party. (copy attached 51A).
52. A letter from Pagnutti to Gallimberti, undated, dealing with the despatch of funds (copy attached 52A).
53. A letter from Pagnutti to Gallimberti dated 29th March 1949, refers to B.B.S. (Beahir Boy Saadani ?) (copy attached 53A).

12a
EXTRACT from Foreign Office file J.10112/9 received 6.5.50.

For SF.92/Italy/N.Africa.

COPY.

HEADQUARTERS

BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, TRIPOLITANIA

SECRET.

26th January, 1950.

C/20/P/1

Despatch No.12.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegrams nos. 11, 13^{1a} and No. 1 saving, concerning documents found in the flat of the late Dr. Gallimberti. ^{4a}

Although examination of all these documents is not yet complete, I am now in a position to report on those dealing with the financial transactions undertaken by Dr. Gallimberti for propaganda purposes (see para. 2 (b) of my tel. no. 1 saving).

I enclose in duplicate a complete list of the documents falling in this category together with photostatic copies of the more important of them. I have retained the originals which can be supplied to you if desired. Further photostatic copies can also be prepared of any of the other papers which you may require.

2. These documents prove that Dr. Gallimberti, who was serving in this territory as an official of the Italian Government, received from that government through the Ministry of Italian Africa sums of money, of which 27,000,000 MAL is on record, part of which he expended on the instructions of the Ministry for the purpose of organising and sustaining a pro-Italian political movement among the Tripolitanian Arabs. It is clear that some at least of these dealings were carried out with the knowledge and consent of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (of document No. 4 in the enclosed list).

3. Dr. Gallimberti was assisted in his activities by a number of local Italians, prominent among whom are the advocates Marchese and Cappello, Dr. Manera of the Repatriation Office, Signor Catanese of the Ufficio Danni di Guerra, Dr. Vincenzo Muccio and his brother Raffaelli Muccio of the Ufficio Mutilati di Guerra and Signor Carlo Clusti of the Consorzio Agrario.

4. It is evident that for the last year or so Dr. Gallimberti's financial rectitude has been the object of some concern to his Ministry. On 25th, February 1949 he was sent instructions in somewhat sharp terms enjoining strict accountancy for the sums transmitted (document No. 15 enclosed). In the following May a reminder was sent and in July he was instructed to hand his accounts to the visiting Minister, Signor Alessandrini (Documents Nos. 16 and 17). This he failed to do and on the 23rd July a further severe rebuke came from the Ministry (Document No. 19) followed by two letters in September (Nos. 20 and 21) the second of which refers to the sum of 18 million lire unaccounted for.

His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

/over.

24/1/50
24/1/50

5. Although Gallimberti may have been unable to account for all the money placed at his disposal, there is no doubt that very considerable sums were put to political uses. Evidence of this is to be found in the 237 signed receipts and 129 unsigned payment notes which have been discovered. These receipts are of considerable interest, showing as they do that not only those whose friendship to Italy was known but also various government officials, prominent notables, and viciferous 'patriots' - men in all walks of life - accepted the bounty of the Italian state.

In particular the Istiqlal (Independence) Party and to a lesser extent the Arab ex-servicemens' organization, received subsidies amounting to many millions of lire. Apart from administrative expenses (including 100,000 MAL for 'rent' in the desert outpost of Hon) large monthly payments were made to leading local personalities in order to secure their adherence to the party, in addition to which the Italian Government would appear to have footed the bill for the visit of the Istiqlal Delegation to Lake Success.

6. It is interesting to note that Gallimberti's activities extended even to Cyrenaica where it would appear he employed a number of agents under the direction of Yussef Ben Katou, who is well known for his pro-Italian sympathies.

I am addressing a separate communication to the British Resident in Benghazi on this aspect of the matter.

7. As to the channels through which these funds may have been transferred from Italy to Tripolitania there are at least two regular methods which may have been employed. It would be possible without much fear of detection for the Italian Government to pay money to the Consorzio Agrario office in Rome and for corresponding sums to be made available by their office in Tripoli. There is evidence of at least one such payment having been made and the prominence of Signor Carlo Giusti's name on these transactions lends colour to this view (Signor Giusti is Managing Director of the Consorzio Agrario in Tripoli).

It is apparent on the other hand that some of Gallimberti's correspondence on the subject in question was brought from Rome by the hand of an Alitalia employee. It is not unlikely that the same method may have been adopted for the transfer of money.

There are however many other possibilities and on the evidence that has so far come to light the chances of any successful action for infringement of the currency laws would appear to be slender.

8. With regard to the action to be taken in consequence of these exposures, you will doubtless wish to make suitable representations to the Italian Government and to suggest inter alia that the legitimate functions of Dr. Gallimberti's office should be taken over in future by Signor Caja. As far as local action is concerned I would recommend as a minimum the expulsion from the territory of certain well-known political agents (e.g. Catanese, Marchese, Manera and Cappello) and the immediate closure of the Danni di Guerra and Mutilati di Guerra offices.

9. I will report on the remainder of the documents discovered in Dr. Gallimberti's flat as soon as they have been properly examined and analysed.

10. A copy of this despatch, without enclosures, has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome, the British Resident in Benghazi and the British Middle East Office in Cairo.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
signed(T.R. Blackley).

081

21 JAN 1950

11a

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

By Confidential Bag

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Blackley
No. 1 Saving
10th January, 1950.

R. 19th January, 1950.

Repeated to: Rome, Benghazi, B.M.E.O. (Cairo)

PA 57.92/Italy/
N. Africa

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1 Saving of 18th January 1950, Repeated for information Saving to Rome, Benghazi and B.M.E.O. (Cairo).

50 - 1a

My telegrams Nos. 9 and 11 and your telegram No. 19. Search of Dr. Gallimberti's office was carried out on 14th January in the presence of a witness selected by Signor Gaja. No further incriminating documents were discovered.

2. Papers of interest found in the flat fall into three main categories -

- (a) Confidential documents belonging to the Administration. These are of small security importance and do not include any material received from or addressed to the Foreign Office. (One or two of them are palpable forgeries). Suitable steps will be taken to trace the sources of leakage.
- (b) Documents relating to the financial transactions undertaken by Dr. Gallimberti for propaganda purposes and the funds at his disposal.
- (c) Documents of general political and intelligence interest, illustrative of the aims and methods of the Ministry of Italian Africa.

3. Police examination of all these documents has not yet been completed, but the indications are that some at least of the money reached Gallimberti through the channel of the Consorzio Agrario.

4. I will report fully as soon as investigations are finished in order that you may make such representations as you may see fit to the Italian Government and instruct what action should be taken locally. The latter may include expulsion from the territory of certain political agents and the closing of the Danni di Guerra Office which has been used as cover for much underhand activity.

051/EP
24/5/50

Copy in P.F. 604,195.

TOP SECRET

10A

*OS to note 11/11/11
very much to be noted
full report was received 24/1
25/1
26/1
27/1
28/1
29/1
30/1
31/1
1911/50*

I went yesterday to see Mr. Clutton, head of the African Department at the Foreign Office, who had in fact already given permission for GALIMBERTI's office to be searched. All that the Foreign Office knows so far about the circumstances is contained in two telegrams received from the Chief Administrator. These telegrams have been given diplomatic distribution in the Foreign Office, and copies of them have not been sent to us. We shall no doubt be getting a full report from the D.S.C. Tripolitania; but meanwhile circumstances as shown in these two telegrams to the Foreign Office are briefly as follows:

GALIMBERTI was the senior representative in Tripolitania of the Italian Ministry for Italian Africa, and had only fairly recently taken up his post. His duties were almost wholly concerned with the repatriation of Italians, for which purpose the Italian Government put large funds at his disposal. A day or two ago he was found dead in his flat. The British Police went to the flat as part of their normal routine in order to establish the cause of GALIMBERTI's death. They found a note signed by GALIMBERTI, which clearly indicated that he had taken his own life. They also found a large number of receipts signed by Arabs for money received by them from GALIMBERTI, and drawers full of papers which were clearly copies of correspondence from the British Administration's secret files. In addition there were other documents showing that the Italian Government had set up a highly efficient and secret organisation throughout Tripolitania for political subversion and espionage. It will obviously take some time to examine all the papers found in GALIMBERTI's flat; and if such sort of documents were found in his flat, one wonders what will be found in his office. The search of his office has only just been authorised, and yesterday the Foreign Office had no news of what had been found there.

The Italian Embassy here have already asked the Foreign Office not to search GALIMBERTI's office, as in their opinion this could only prejudice Anglo-Italian relations. The reply of the Foreign Office was that so far from prejudicing them, such a search would be likely to clarify them. The Italians have in fact thoroughly got the wind up, as they had been caught red-handed in the wholesale conduct of improper activities in North Africa, which have of course long been suspected by us and denied by them.

W.H. Porter

C.S.L.
18.1.50

D.L. Haldane Porter

TOP SECRET

18.1.50

TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH

Precedence : **ROUTINE**

Security Classification : **TOP SECRET**

To : **S.I.M.E.**

Office File No. **SF. 92/1124/N. Africa** Section of Origin **Q.S.L.**

Date **17.1.50**

Signed **D.L.H. Porter**

Rpt. : **D.S.O. Tripoli**

Copy to:

Inf. :

Reference your ~~letter~~ **6/3-70** telegram No. **151.50**

RECEIVED.

18 JAN 1950

Permission already given.

No.	DS/ 7009/50
Date	18.1.50
Enciphered by	TS



The text of this telegram is **Unparaphrased**, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher without being **Paraphrased**. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

Copy in
P.F. 604, 195.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

17/03.

BA

Precedence : PRIORITY Security Classification : TOP SECRET

From : S. J. M. E. Office File No. Originator's No. 7/3

..... Date of Origin 16.1.50.

Rpt. Passed for Action to C. S. Date of Receipt 16.1.50.

Inf. Copies to Deciphered by P. M. M.

Further to our 6/15/1/50/3.

See our letter P.F. 23743/Y/24 of 9.1.50. paragraph 49 and 54.

The text of this telegram is **Unparaphrased**, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher without being **Paraphrased**. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

Form 100.

✓ 10/1/50

Copy in P.F.604,195.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

18105

7a

Precedence.....P.R.I.O.R.I.T.Y..... Security Classification.....T.O.P..S.E.C.R.E.T

From: S.I.M.E. Office File No.....Originator's No. 6/3.....

Head Office

Passed for O.S. 1 - The pt of info. 1/1/50 Date of Origin.....15.1.50.

Action to O.S. Date of Receipt.....16.1.50.

Info.....DSO Tripoli

Copies to.....Decyphered by.....PT/ERT..

TOP SECRET. Further distribution to be made by.....O.S.....

Grateful your support Tripoli administration's application

to Foreign Office for permission search GALIMBERTI's office. Foreign Office will explain circumstances. We are interested as GALIMBERTI believed involved in espionage and investigation may help in clarifying CHASUBLE case.

O.T.P.

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No.: S.F.92/Italy/North Africa. Name:
 Original in File No.: P.F.604.195. Serial: 8a. Receipt Date: 14.1.50.
 Original from: S.I.M.E. SDUE/PP.23743/Y/B.4. Dated: 9.1.50.
 Under Ref.: Dated:
 Extracted on: 18.1.50. by: M.E.B. Section: R.5.

Extract from Report on the CHASUBLE Case enclosed in above letter.

.....
 CHASUBLE LE paid several visits to CHAPRON's flat after this interview, and received the following instructions from him. Matteo CALIMBERTI, CHAPRON's successor in Tripoli as the representative of the Ministry of Italian Africa, would receive a letter from Rome instructing him to place certain funds at the disposal of a lawyer named MARCHESI, who would in turn make payments to CHASUBLE, whose cover-name was to be TITO. The source of these funds was to be the Consorzio Agrario, (Farmers' Cooperative). This fund was alleged to be the chief source of money for financing pro-Italian activities in Tripolitania.

.....
 CHASUBLE informed the DSO that upon his return to Tripoli he was to put himself under the orders of CALIMBERTI, MARCHESI, CAPELLO and GAYA, the Italian Foreign representative there. His exact relations with these men were not at this stage clear, nor did he attempt to explain to the DSO what they were. He did answer questions, however, on

- 2 -

the letter which he alleged he had received from his brother, and which had brought about his confession to the DSO that he was a S.I.M. D/A.

.....
 N.B. S.I.M.E., in their covering letter, make the following comment:-

"The main thread of the case, - Italian sponsored political subversion in Tripolitania - is now fairly clear. What does not yet emerge is the relationship of S.I.M., M.S.I., and the Church in the person of the Bishop of Tripoli. Nor do we yet know whether the Italian communist party did in fact sponsor the espionage carried out by the PDF in Tripoli."

OSI

13 JAN 1950

5a

Cypher/OTP

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Mercer

No. 9

D. 2.10 p.m. 12th January, 1950.

R. 2.29 p.m. 12th January, 1950.

12th January, 1950.

Repeated to Rome

Benghazi.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 9 of
January 12th repeated for information to Rome and Benghazi.

Doctor Gallimberti the representative in Tripoli of
the Ministry of Italian Africa was found dead yesterday
evening in a gas-filled room in his residence in Tripoli.

2. All evidence points to suicide.

[Advance copies sent to Mr. Wright and
Head of African Department.]

///

PA SF.92/71-12/10 Africa

OSI/EP
24/5/50

Foreign Office File

Rec'd 6.5.50.

JT.10112/4

For SF.93/Italy/North Africa.

4a

(This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on).

Cypher/OTT

DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION

From Tripoli to Foreign Office.

Mr. Mercer

D.7.36.p.m. 13th January, 1950.

No. 13.

13th January, 1950.

R.7.58.p.m. 13th January, 1950.

Repeated to Rome
Saving to Benghazi.

B.M.E.O. (Cairo).

PRIORITY

(J.T.10112/4)

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 13 of 13th January,
repeated for information to Rome and Saving to Benghazi and B.M.E.O. (Cairo).

My telegram No. 11. (J.T.10112/3)

Search of GALLIMBERTI's flat has revealed a large number of documents which confirm our suspicions. They include numerous receipts from Arabs for money paid out to them and a letter from Ministry of Italian Africa dated September 1949 asking GALLIMBERTI to account for the sum of 18,000,000 Italian lire which they had supplied to him from July to September 1949 inclusive. These and other documents are now being examined by the police and it is too early as yet to comment on them in detail. They established without doubt that an extensive propaganda and intelligence service was being organised from GALLIMBERTI's office and strengthen our reasons for believing that serious breaches of currency regulations may have occurred.

2. We have also found in the flat a number of secret and confidential intelligence reports which are the property of this Administration. These discoveries strengthen our grounds for searching GALLIMBERTI's office.

3. Representatives selected by Signor GAJA to attend the search of the flat refused to do so unless they were allowed to decide which documents the police should be allowed to remove. We were unable to agree to these conditions and the search was therefore conducted in the presence of two impartial Italian witnesses.

4. Since the above was drafted I have received your telegram No. 19 approving the search of the office. I am most grateful for this prompt reply and intend to proceed with the search tomorrow after notifying Signor GAJA. We had already indicated to him that one of the reasons for the search is the detection of possible currency offences and I fear it would be too obviously disingenuous to pretend that such extensive searches are necessary merely to ascertain the cause of GALLIMBERTI's death.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Benghazi and B.M.E.O. (Cairo) as my telegrams Nos. 2 and 2 respectively.

(Repeated Saving to Benghazi and B.M.E.O. (Cairo))

ADVANCE COPIES.

Head of African Department.
Mr. Wright.

FPF

OS/EP
24/5/50

Foreign Office File No. JT 10112/3

Rec'd 6.5.50.

For SF.92/Italy/North Africa.

Cypher/OTM
Confidential

DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION

3a

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ROME

No. 105

13th January, 1950.

D. 8.30.p.m. 13th January, 1950.

Repeated Tripoli No.20. (Immediate)

Benghazi No.3. Saving.

B.M.E.O. (Cairo) No.26 Saving.

IMMEDIATE.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Rome telegram No.105 of January 13th, repeated for information to Tripoli and saving to Benghazi and B.M.E.O. (Cairo)

My telegram to Tripoli No.19 (of the 13th January: GALLIMBERTI).

Counsellor of the Italian Embassy called this afternoon on instructions from Rome to request that GALLIMBERTI's papers should not be examined by the police but handed over to his widow. The Italian Government felt entitled to ask this in view of GALLIMBERTI's official status and the fact that his death was obviously suicide.

2. Signor D'AJETA was informed that as a result of representations by GAJA the question had been considered but that we did not feel able to interfere with normal police procedure. The Acting Chief Administrator had accordingly been authorised to examine GALLIMBERTI's papers both in his flat and in his office.

BBBB

051/EP
24/5/50

For SF.92/Italy/North Africa.

(This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on).

Cyber/OTT

DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION

FR M TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Mercer.

No. 11.
12th January, 1950.

D. 8.34.p.m. 12th January, 1950.
R. 3.00.p.m. 12th January, 1950.

Repeated to Rome,
Saving to:- Benghazi B.M.E.O. (Cairo)

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 11. of January 12th,
repeated for information to Rome, Saving Benghazi and B.M.E.O. (Cairo).

As reported briefly in my telegram No. 9. the body of Dr. GALLINBERTI representative in Tripoli of Ministry of Italian Africa, was found last night in his flat in circumstances which point to his having committed suicide. A document found by the body in GALLINBERTI's hand-writing states "I have stolen nothing. I have distributed everything to the people who are greedy and who will never love us but who will always blackmail us." Another typewritten document found in the flat gives an estimate of expenses for the month of January 1950, the major item in which is 1,500,000 mal to be paid to Independence Party in Tripoli. Total expenses for the month amount to 1,825,000 mal, almost all of which is devoted to various forms of Italian propaganda amongst the Arabs and only 50,000 mal to registration of Italians to Italy which was ostensibly the purpose of GALLINBERTI's mission. Discovery of the latter document is unknown to local Italians who are nevertheless in a state of obvious apprehension as to what may come to light in the course of the police enquiry.

2. Further information has been volunteered by a credible source that GALLINBERTI had received 30,000,000 mal from Italy for disbursement in Tripoli and had recently been asked officially to account for the money. Source suggested that this might have some bearing on the circumstances of his suicide. Apart from political implications of these dealings it would appear prima facie that serious currency offences might have been committed and on this score I have instituted police inquiries in the course of which it will be necessary to search GALLINBERTI's flat for relevant documents. This search is being conducted tonight in the presence of an impartial representative suggested by Signor GAJA.

3. I had intended conducting a simultaneous search of GALLINBERTI's office but in view of representations by Signor GAJA I have agreed with him to defer doing so pending reference to you. Signor GAJA was not claiming diplomatic immunity for the office but entered a plea that we should seriously consider possible unfortunate effects of such a search on Anglo-Italian relations.

4. I have, as you know, been trying for a long time to obtain evidence regarding alleged distribution here of official Italian funds for the purpose of political penetration and there is every reason to believe that such evidence may now be revealed. Unless therefore the search of the flat produces sufficient material to render any further search unnecessary, I propose, subject to your approval, to proceed with the search of the office during the week-end. Signor GAJA's representative would again be present.

5. Most stringent precautions would naturally be taken to prevent any leakage here of such information as may be disclosed.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Benghazi and B.M.E.O. (Cairo) as my telegrams Nos. 1 and 1 respectively. Advanced Copies sent to Mr. Wright and Head of African Department.

7777

05/1/EP
24/5/50



SF92-0147-0207/V1